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For a long time, sociologists, who call themselves social theorists, have placed them-
selyes under the authority of men long since dead. And nowhere is this more true
than with the concept of authority itself. Since Max Weber, sociologists have, with
increasing obedience, submitted themselves to the three ideal types of traditional,
rational, and charismatic authority, sometimes with an enthusiasm and a bündness
that would make Weber uncomfortable if he were here to observe it.
I think it is time to begin afresh in thinking about authority, to attempt to
establish some conceptions that wül do more for us' than the concept of authority
has done in the past.
And I think that it is appropriate to do so at the Deutscher Soziologentag. The
challenge I am posing is to theoretical work which was carried out on German soü,
and it is well to make the challenge on German soil.
I focus on the concept of authority for two reasons. First of all, it is central to
social theory, and without a strong foundation-stone at this point, it becomes
difficult to buüd a social theory. Second, there has grown up in social theory
recently a set of ideas, loosely borrowed from economics, which go under the
heading of „exchange theory." In the United States, the names of Peter Blau and
George Homans are most fully associated with these ideas. Yet a broad-minded or
imperiaüstic economist, looking at that work.could easüy argue that there is nothing
new here, that sociologists are introducing no principles over and above those which
economists had been using all along. And some economists, such as my colleague
Gary Becker at the University of Chicago, have already been applying ideas of
economic exchange to such sociological domains as marriage and divorce, friend-
ship, apparent altruism, crime, and racial discrimination.
Few sociologists would concede to the economist that a theory of social Organi¬
zation can be constructed wholly from economists' principles of exchange; and it is
here that authority is especially important. For authority, the obedience by one
person to another's commands, hes wholly outside the domain of economists, and
is a concept wholly foreign to them (except for those who take it as given). Yet it is
This paper is a modification of a paper delivered as the second Paul F. Lazarsfeld lecture at
Columbia University on March 7, 1980, and published as .Authority Systems" in Public
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 143-163, Summer 1980.
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obviously central to the functioning of society, and as I wül try to show this mor-
ning, it important in understanding an extremely wide ränge of action.
My agenda, then, is to sketch the outlines of a concept of authority which wül
be useful in this way. But to be less vague, these are some of the thüigs I would like
a concept of authority to be useful for: What are the conditions under which
revolutions against an estabüshed authority System arise? Why is is that workers in
large firms work less hard than workers in smaU firms, and that those who work for
themselves work hardest of aU? Why is it that the most rapidly growing form of
economic Organization in the United States (which is the only place I have observed
it) is the franchise, that is, an enterprise which is owned locaUy, yet part of a natio¬
nal or international chain (like a McDonald's restaurant, for example)?
Why are petty officials in government bureaucracies so insensitive to cüents'
needs or demands? Why do communes exhibit such a high degree of instabiüty in
comparison to other organizations? When there is a fire alarm in a crowded theater,
there is offen a panic. Why is this? Equally important, why is it that under simüar
cücumstances, a panic wül sometimes occur, sometimes not? Why is it that in the
behavior of crowds that erupt into violence, there is the commonly-noted period,
during which the crowd is „milhng around," before any action takes place?
There are also some more concrete questions, specific to time and place, which I
would like to be able to answer. For example, what is it that makes Honda auto¬
mobiles, for example, of higher quality than most automobiles? Why is it, in the
communes that grew up in the late 1960's, that the principal problems of chüd-
rearing were those of inattention to chüdren? Why is it, in large automobüe firms in
the United States, that managers are much better motivated than workers?
Now this is a wide ränge of questions indeed, and I wül not pretend that before I
finish today I wül have answered them all. Rather, I want the questions to indicate
the ränge or scope of phenomena that I beüeve should be explainable through use
of a Single theoretical framework.
The framework I wül introduce to do this has several important characteristics.
The first is that it is individuaüstic, like the exchange theory I just cast aspersions
on. The elements of the theory are individual persons, not groups, organizations, or
societies. Second, these persons are regarded as purposive, acting in what they see as
theü own best interest. Thüd, they are endowed with certain resources, consisting
of control over, or rights to control, certain events or actions or thüigs. You may, if
you like, think of this as compatible with a natural rights phüosophical perspective.
Or you may think of the processes I wül describe as occurring within a legal System
in which ownership of rights is weh defined.
We begin, then, with purposive actors, who know theü interests and have certain
resources by which they can act to realize those interests. The nature of the theory
I wül describe consists of specifying what such actors will do under various cücum¬
stances, and seeing just what social configurations result. The interest, of course, is
in the predicted social configurations, for it is these that may aUow us to answer the
kinds of questions I have just posed. Thus although the theoretical starting point is
individuaüstic, the end point, after authority Systems are constructed, includes
corporate actors as well.
Although this starting point as I have described it has offen been associated with
what is called „exchange theory" in sociology, I want to specify actions that are
more general than excahnge, though leading under certain cücumstances to exchange.
In partikular, the one social action that these purposive persons may take, leading
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to the creation of authority Systems, is that of transferring control or the rights of
control over resources they control. There need in fact be no reciprocation, no
exchange. AU that is necessary is that the transfer of control be made in what the
person regards as his best interest-as, for example, when a person who is lost follows
the directions of a stranger, thus giving to that stranger control over the direction
he takes.
At this point, it becomes possible to define an authority relation. An authority
relation exists when there has been a transfer of control of a particular kind of
resource: one's own actions. The person who has made this transfer becomes the
subordinate, the person to whom the transfer is made becomes the superordinate.
Now some of you may be surprised at my focus upon the subordinate. But this
is essential to the theory that I wül outline, and I believe it is essential to the
understanding of authority Systems. In fact, I believe the faüure to do so is the
crucial error in most attempts to develop a theory of authority. In the theory as I
will sketch it, the superordinate's action, whüe not quite incidental, is nevertheless
not so important as that of the subordinate. The reason is that the superordinate's
action is less problematic. What is problematic is one person's voluntarily subor-
dinating himself to the wül of another.
There may also be some objection to my insistence on voluntary action, since
authority Systems are commonly regarded as coercive, and we all know of cases
that are exceedingly so. But even the classical theorists who looked at authority
more nearly from the point of view of the superordinate's action recognized this.
Max Weber (1947) said in his definition of authority that „Imperative coordination
(control) was defined above as the probability that specific commands (or aU com-
mands) from a given source will be obeyed by agivengroup of persons ... A criterion
... is a certain minimum of voluntary Submission." And Georg Simmel (1950), in
his discussion of authority, emphasized that choice existed even for persons subject
to the most despotic authority. As Weber and Simmel both recognized, although
the capacity of the superordinate in certain authority relations to inflict härm as
well as to extend rewards may lead us to describe the relation as coercive, it does
not change the fact that the subordinate always exercises a choice of whether or
not to obey, since it is he who has immediate or düect control over his actions.
But if you don't agree with me, I ask you to take these starting points on faith,
or in effect to put yourself temporarily under my authority, in order that we may
proceed. An authority relation exists, then, when there has been a transfer of rights
of control by a person, who becomes the subordinate, over certain of his own
actions. The fact that it is his own actions over which rights of control are transfer¬
red has an important implication. This is an inalienable resource. It is not like a
good which he may physically hand over to another, as in the classic economic
model of transitory exchanges. When rights of control over inaüenable resources
have been transferred into another's hands there is an ongoing relation-in this case
the authority relation-which continues untü those rights are withdrawn. I should
point out also another aspect of this definition. Although the authority relation is
an asymmetric one, this does not preclude overall symmetry, as when two persons
each transfer control over certain of theü acitons to each other: the prototypical
case is that of two persons deeply in love, each placing most of theü actions under
the control of the other.
So far I have düected attention to the transfer of rights of control, what we may
call the vesting of authority in another. But some may rightly object that in certain
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authority Systems, such as that of a nation-state and its Citizens, or parents and
chüdren, the person is born into the authority relation, and does not make such a
voluntary transfer. In that case, the voluntary action at issue is not that of transfer¬
ring rights of control over one's own action, not vesting authority, but withdrawing
the transfer, divesting authority. Shortly, I will divide the problems of authority
Systems into those of statics and those of dymanics. The vesting and divesting of
authority wül be the two actions of the subordinate, which, taken together with
two actions of the superordinate, comprise the dynamics of authority Systems. But
more of that shortly.
For the present, it is necessary to introduce two distinctions that wül lead to
differing „types" of authority Systems. I do this with fuU recognition of the skeptic-
ism with which typologies have come-and properly so-to be regarded in social
theory. Thus I wül indicate, as I introduce each distinction, something about what I
expect its utüity for the theory to be.
The first distinction is the distinction between two kinds of transfers: one in
which the transfer is made in return for some extrinsic benefit, such as a monetary
wage, and the other in which the transfer is made wholly without such extrinsic
benefit. In the first case, the subordinate has no expectation that the authority as
exercised wiU benefit him, since there are extrinsic benefits, whüe in the second,
the transfer is made in the expectation that the very exercise of the authority wül
benefit him. When a prospective employee transfers to a prospective employer the
right to control certain of his actions during certain periods of time during the day,
he does so in return for monetary payment. When, on the other hand, he joins a
union, he transfers to a union representative his rights to conduct wage bargaining
with the employer and be bound by the results of that bargaining.
He thus gives the union representative authority over certain of his actions, not
because of an extrinsic benefit, but because he believes the very exercise of this
right by the union representative wül benefit him more than would his own exercise
of that right.
The first of these authority relations I will call disjoint, and the second conjoint,
denoting that in the first the interests that the subordinate expects wül be pursued
in the exercise of authority are not the same as those of the subordinate, whüe in
the second, those interests are the same. Systems of authority made up whoUy or
largely of disjoint authority relations may be called disjoint authority Systems,
whüe Systems made up wholly or largely of conjoint authority relations may be
called conjoint authority Systems.
The utüity of this distinction between disjoint and conjoint authority relations
or Systems hes not simply in the fact that the distinction separates into two broad
classes of authority Systems that we would see as phenotypicaUy very different
from each other. It hes, rather, in the fact that the problems of statics in the two
kinds of Systems are very different. In the disjoint System, the subordinate has no
interest in the goal of the Organization, for his own goals are extrinsically satisfied.
This means first that he need pay less attention to „democratic control" of the
superordinate's actions; he need only be concerned that the superordinate is acting
in his own interest. Second, when he acts under the authority of the superordinate,
his actions are not reinforced by his own parallel interests or motivations, since he
is not interested in the outcome, and in obeying authority is only carrying out his
part of a bargain. As a consequence, the problems faced by the superordinate in
policing his actions are much more serious than in the conjoint System. In disjoint
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authority Systems, we would expect to see far more in the way of poücing mechanisms
than in conjoint Systems.
A different kind of motivational problem can be expected to arise in a conjoint
authority System, the ideal-typical case of which is the commune. In such an authority
system all members have the same interest. Thus my feUow-members' actions will
benefit me as much as wül my own, and it is wise for me to let them do it aü-to sit
and be a free rider. We would predict, then, that conjoint authority Systems which
survive wül generally be small; we would also predict that some Substitute motiva¬
tional force, such as the presence of social norms or ideological fervor, wül be used
in conjoint authority Systems to overcome motivational problems.
A second major distinction I will make is between simple authority System and
complex authority Systems. In a simple authority System, the authority is exercised
by the same actor in whom it is vested, that is, the superordinate. In a complex
authority system it is not, but rather is exercised by someonel shaU caU a lieutenant
or an agent. Thus a simple authority system at minimum may contain only two
persons, subordinate and superordinate, where the minimum number in a complex
authority system is three, subordinate, superordinate, and leiutenant. This does not
mean that authority Systems composed of simple authority relations need be flat,
though there is a tendency for that to be the case. But historically, there have been
numerous examples of multi-layered Systems composed of simple authority relations.
Perhaps the best example is the feudal system of the Middle Ages. A vassal was
enfeoffed to his lord, who stood in authority over him, and that lord was enfeoffed,
as a vassal, to his lord. But the higher lord had no düect authority over the vassals
of his subordinate, the lower. They paid homage only to him, were subject wholly
to his authority, had no rights of appeal to the higher lord nor were bound by his
Orders. The system thus consisted of a concatenation of simple authority relations
from which a multi-layered structure was buüt.
A complex authority System can arise only when the transfer made by a sub¬
ordinate includes both the right to control his actions, and another right: the right
to transfer or delegate the first right to another. We may ask just when such a more
comprehensive transfer by the subordinate occurs, to get some idea of the kind of
authority system that tends to become complex. Füst, it is clear that when an actor
vests authority not in a natural person but in a corporate actor, as an employee of
Siemens does for example in becoming an employee, then he must include the right
to delegate this authority to a lieutenant. For corporate actors, by theü very intan-
gibüity, must act through the agency of natural persons. Or whenever a person
swears allegiance to a nation-state, he does the same thing: the nation acts only
through its agents, government officials, and the person impücitly includes in his
vesting of authority the right to delegate that authority. Thus whevever a person
places himself under the authority of a corporate employer, he includes the right
to delegate that authority, and thus facüitates a complex authority system.
A person is also more likely to include the right to delegate in a disjoint authority
relation than a conjoint one. This is not, as in the preceding case, a logical necessity,
but stems rather from rationaüty on the part of the subordinate. If he has no
interest in the goal toward which the authority is exercised (as he does not in a
disjoint relation), then he is uninterested in whether the authority is exercised
directly by the person in whom he vests it, or by another. If he expects the authority
to be exercised in a way that will benefit him, as in a conjoint relation, he is in
effect placing trust in the superordinate to act in his interest, and he may not include
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the right to delegate authority. This suggests something of a paradox: he must trust
a person more to vest authority without an extrinsic benefit (i.e., in a conjoint
relation), but despite this greater trust he wül less ükely include in that vesting of
authority the additional right to delegate. A person gives much authority over his
actions to someone he loves; but he does not give to the other the right to transfer
that authority to a thüd party. In a charismatic vesting of authority, which is
another conjoint relation, the foUower may transfer control over an extraordinary
ränge of his actions to the charismatic leader, but he may be whoUy unwüüng to
take Orders from a üeutenant. (It is for this reason that heutenants in such Systems
often begin any command by „In the name of Jesus Christ" or „In the name of
Napoleon Bonaparte, I command you to ...")Thus there appear to be strong reasons
why a conjoint authority relation is less ükely to include the right to delegate than
a disjoint one. But in this as weU as in the broader question of when the right to
delegate is included in the vesting of authority, there is extensive need for empirical
investigation. Just when is this right included in the vesting of authority, and when
is it not? And how (as in the problem of succession or routinization in charismatic
authority) does the superordinate sometimes manage to acquüe that right when it
is initially not part of the authority vested in him? For as is generaUy known, it
becomes practically impossible for a charismatic leader to exercise düect authority
with no heutenants, as his following grows large. Thus no matter how exclusively
authority is vested in him personaUy, he wül have a strong incentive to exercise that
authority not directly, but through heutenants.
The existence of this second right, the right to transfer authority once vested,
makes possible an action on the part of the superordinate other than mere exercise
of authority. This is, of course, the delegation of authority to a lieutenant or agent.
Once having authority vested in him, the superordinate may either keep it to be
exercised directly, or may delegate it to a heutenant, subordinate to him but in
authority over the subordinate.
As in the case of the conjoint-disjoint distinction made earlier, it is necessary to
justify the simple-complex distinction in terms of its utiüty in the study of author¬
ity Systems. Füst, in the simple authority System, authority is exercised by an actor
düectly interested in the outcome of the action. The superordinate exercises
authority toward a goal he has himself estabüshed. But in a complex authority
system, this is true only for the superordinate. For the heutenants and sub-üeute-
nants who exercise authority at intermediate levels and düectly over the original
subordinate, theü interest is satisfied by the extrinsic benefits they have received
(such as a money wage). It is not of düect interest to them, unless the super¬
ordinate has in some way managed to make theü benefits contingent on it, whether
the outcome desüed by the superordinate is achieved or not. Thus one can expect
some possible conflicts of interest among the heutenants, between theü own
personal interests and those that the superordinate has düected them to pursue, and
one can expect also defects in the functioning of these authority Systems, arising
from the confüct of interest. Just as the subordinate has no interest in the outcome
of action in a disjoint authority relation, the üeutenant has no interest in a complex
disjoint authority relation.
It is also in the complex authority relation that the concept of position apart
from the person, and the notion of a person „occuping a position" in the Organiza¬
tion arises. For in delegation of authority, it becomes useful for the superordinate
to delegate the authority, and the resources which accompany it, to something
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other than the üeutenant himself, so that they do not become his personal property.
The right to use certain resources is a right delegated to the lieutenant himself, as
part of the authority, but not ownership rights-not the right to dispose of the
resources, nor the right to benefit personaUy from them. What has naturally evolved
as a convenient device is invention of the concept of „position," so that the author¬
ity and the resources to exercise it are delegated to the position, remain the pro¬
perty of the position (which is part of the authority system), and are merely used
by the person who occupies that position. With this device, the conception of an
abstract position as distinct from the person occupying it, and as the recipient of
delegated authority, authority Systems came to be able to take on a wholly new
character. The idea of a system or structure or Organization quite apart from the
particular persons who occupied it became possible. Historically, this was not easüy
arrived at, but when it was, the scope and variety of organizations multiplied. The
organizational form that has come to be known as bureaucracy carries with it
certain problems and difficulties that seem pecuüar to it, as well as certain potential
versatiüty that some other kinds of authority Systems do not possess.
In terms of the two conceptual distinctions I have made here, a bureaucracy is a
disjoint complex authority system, disjoint because interests or ends are not shared
by superordinate and subordinate, and complex because the authority is delegated
to a structure of intermediate positions that constitute the bureaucracy.
These two distinctions I have made form four logically possible types, conjoint-
simple, conjoint-complex, disjoint-simple, and disjoint-complex. In the ceüs of the
fourfold table I have indicated examples of each of these four types.
Simple Complex
Conjoint 1. Commune 2. Nation-state
Disjoint 3.Smallshop 4. Bureaucracy
Why is it that there is a tendency toward organizations of types 1 and 4? I think
that 2 is infrequent because in conjoint transfers of control it is often not rational
to transfer the right to delegate; and 3 is infrequent because of the problems of
poücing in disjoint authority relations limit the span of control, and thus hmit
simple conjoint authority Systems to small size.
Statics and Dynamics of Authority Systems
Having made these minimal distinctions among different kinds of authority Systems,
it becomes possible to divide the processes and problems of authority Systems into
statics and dynamics. What I mean by the statics af authority Systems are those
processes and problems that arise within a given estabhshed authority structure. By
the dynamics of authority Systems, I mean those processes and problems involved
in establishing or changing the structure an authority system. Making this division,
it becomes possible to be clear about just when we are investigating problems of
social change, or potential change, and when we are confining ourselves to the
study of problems within or between authority Systems that do not imply change in
the structure of those Systems.
Viewed in this way, there are four actions that comprise the dynamics of author¬
ity Systems, two on the part of the subordinate, and two on the part of the super-
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ordinate. The subordinate (or subordinate-to-be) may vest authority in a super¬
ordinate, and he may divest the superordinate of the vested authority, that is,
withdrawing authority previously vested.
The vesting of authority creates the potential for an authority structure. The
delegation of authority by the superordinate creates that structure. The super¬
ordinate has two actions that change the structure: delegation of authority, and
revoking of delegated authority.
Actions involved in the statics of authority Systems are the exercise of authority
by the superordinate or the agent, and response to the exercise of authority by the
subordinate (or by the agent, if the authority is exercised over him by an actor
superordinate to him).
I believe that much of the reason for the relatively uninteresting character of
much theory of authority Systems is theü concentration upon the statics of author¬
ity Systems. Much of Organization theory, and most of that which stems from the
„management decision making" literature, is concerned with the exercise of authority
by superordinates in ways that lead to efficient achievement of organizational goals.
Much sociological theory and research into the malfunctioning of organizations is
concerned with the response of subordinates to the exercise of authority within a
given authority structure. But some of the more interesting problems of authority
Systems, that expand into a far wider ränge of sociological phenomena than merely
„Organization theory," are those concerned with the dynamics of authority Systems
rather than theü statics.
Thus I wül begin the investigation of sociological problems of authority Systems
with the dynamics.
Dynamics of Authority Systems
As indicated earüer, in some authority Systems such as those of the nation-state and
the famüy, persons are born into the system. The exercise of choice is thus not a
decision to vest authority in a superordinate, but to divest the superordinate of
authority. Yet this may not be possible for an individual to do alone, depending on
the kind of authoritative or coercive resources held by the superordinate. To divest
oneself of the authority of a national government requües leaving the territory of
the nation-state, an action that is sometimes prevented by force.
Another alternative may exist, however: to oppose the coercive authority of the
State, and by organized action to replace the regime in authority with another. Such
actions are revolutions or coups d'etat. The empirical question is the question of
the conditions under which revolutions occur, and the question of the conditions
under which coups d'etat occur. Simüar empirical questions arise concerning revolts
and overturns of administrative regimes in other conjoint authority Systems: in
trade unions, where leadership is thrown out by the members, in schools where a
principal is removed after Opposition by teachers and parents, in churches where
the minister is removed by a revolt in the congregation, and in other bodies of con¬
joint authority. The broader theoretical question in the dynamcis of authority
Systems is the question of the conditions under which authority vested in a super¬
ordinate in a conjoint authority System is withdrawn by subordinates.
The empirical regularities concerning revolutions are becoming increasingly clear.
First, contrary to Marx, revolutions do not arise when the oppression of the working
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classes increases; rather, they occur when social change is especially rapid, which
ordinarily is accompanied by a general improvement in social conditions, rather
than the reverse. Second, though there are a number of revolution theorists who
would argue otherwise, the revolution does not arise as a result of an increased
sense of relative deprivation on the part of the population. Third, revolutions do
tend to arise in conditions when the existing regime has shown itself particularly
weak either (as Theda Skocpol (1979) has recently shown for the French, Russian,
and Chinese revolutions) due to external müitary reversals, to inabiüty to solve
internal economic problems (as Charles Tüly (1978) shows for the French revolu¬
tion), or even in some cases due to reforms that are seen as a sign of weakness.
Fourth, revolutions do not arise as spontaneous rebelhons, springing from sünultane-
ous action on the part of the mass of the population. Rather, they are initiated by
relatively well organized and highly committed opponents of the regime. If mass
participation does occur, it is only after the existing regime is near to being over-
thrown either in the country as a whole or in a local area (as in China, for example,
where peasants were not mobiüzable in the north untü the landlords had left).
These facts taken together suggest the foUowing theoretical formulation: If we
Start with the purposive conception I outhned earher, an actor's ükeühood of
withdrawing authority through participating in a rebelüon depends on the benefits
he sees given a successful overthrow, the effectiveness of his action in bringing
about that overthrow, and the costs of faüure if he does participate. The empüical
facts described above indicate that in most revolutions of which we have examples,
the critical factor is the second of these three elements: for it is when the regime is
weak that effectiveness of this reaction wül be greatest, and it is only those who are
part of an organized Opposition group who, even under a weak regime, can stand
any chance of success. (What sometimes happens, of course, is that once a relatively
powerful and organized group has brought about the revolution, as the nobles in
part did in France through withdrawing Support from the King, or as the Mushm
MuUahs did in Iran, the absence of an authority frees the masses to revolt and take
the revolution in another direction. Thishappened in France, and could weU happen
in Iran, if the central government remains weak.)
One problem with revolutions, of course, as empirical aids for the study of
dynamics of authority Systems, is that as macrosocial phenomena, they are ex-
ceedingly complex, involving not only Single events but complex sequences of
events, not only persons as actors, but corporate actors as weU, both existing and
emergent and evanescent corporate actors. Collective behavior, in contrast, such as
panics and riots, occurs on a smaüer scale, over a shorter sequence of events, and
involves fewer complexities of Organization.
Perhaps I am assuming too much when I assume you wül automaticaüy agree
that coUective behavior involves the dynamics of authority Systems. For these
phenomena are very unlike the stable forms of social Organization we call authority
Systems. Yet'let us look at one such case: panic in a crowded theater. Social psy-
chologists have shown that panic cannot be explained in terms of some ürational
emotional State. Roger Brown (1965) shows that it can be accounted for as wholly
rational behavior in a prisoner's düemma-like Situation: we all may be better off if
none of us run for the exits, but each person must make a decision not for all, but
only for himself. As it turns out under reasonable conditions, a person in the
theater wül find that if others panic and run, he himself is more ükely to escape if
he joins the rush; and if others do not panic, but walk toward the exit, he himself is
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stül better off to run to the exit. As Brown points out, if aU make this assessment,
a panic results.
Yet this is unsatisfactory, for it faüs to account for the fact that
offen a panic
does not occur, in very simüar cücumstances to
those in which, on another occasion,
it does occur. An actor on a stage, or a particularly strong-voiced person in a
prominent place, or some other cücumstance, wül bring
Order to the crowd.
We can account for both the panic and the non-panic if we conjecture that in a
crowded theater, most members of the audience may have impücitly transferred
authority over theü crisis actions to the crowd. It turns out,
if we make some
calculations based on this conjecture, that a rational occupant of the theater
wül
under certain conditions transfer control to the crowd, making his behavior con-
tingent on theüs. An important one of these conditions
is that theü actions are
contingent on his. (For the defect in the prisoner's düemma reasoning
is that it
assumes his action in rushing to the exit wül not affect others, and thus not, in the
end, impede him.) Just how contingent on his own action the
others' actions must
be in order for him to transfer control over his actions to them is given by the ratio
of the losses he can expect by Walking rather than running (controlhng on
the
others' actions) to the gains he can expect from the others' Walking rather
than
running (controlhng on his own actions). The larger the latter quantity,
that is, the
more he gains by the absence of panic, and the smaUer the former,
that is, the less
he loses by not running, whatever the others do, the less the others'
action must be
contingent on his own for him to find it rational to make his contingent
on theüs,
rather than running unüaterally-that is, to transfer authority to them.
When this
occurs, when there is this widespread mutual transfer of authority, to
others in the
crowd, or to „the crowd" itself, the outcome becomes unpredictable, depending
on
chance events. On the other hand, if those conditions are not met, and persons
find it not to theü interest to make theü behavior contingent on others (i.e., to
transfer authority to them), the crowd wül definitely panic.
Thus if we have a broad enough conception of authority Systems to aUow that
persons in a crowded theater may make
a unüateral, voluntary, and transient
vesting of authority over theü escape actions in the other theater occupants,
then
we can account both for the existence of panics and for their non-universality.
Furthermore, we can predict, if we look carefuUy enough at the structure of
the
Situation, who is more hkely to panic and who less hkely. We would expect,
for
example, perhaps counterintuitively, to find those relatively close to the
exits to be
more hkely to run („panic") unüateraUy, whüe those farthest from the exits to
transfer control, making theü actions contingent on what others do.
In another area of coUective behavior, the hostüe riot, the conception of a
transient vesting of authority helps account for certain processes, in particular
the
peculiar „müüng" period, before a hostüe outbreak occurs. In ordinary
cücums¬
tances, most persons have transferred authority over their observably
unlawful
actions to the police or other authorities. In a hostüe crowd with a target (such as
a crowd in Cicero, Illinois in the 1950's which gathered around an apartment
buüding into which the first black famüy had moved, or preceding the Columbia
University Student revolt in the spring of 1968 when students were müüng around
the sundial and wandering back and forth between the sundial and the new
gymnasium excavation site, which was theü target), the members of the
crowd
would find satisfying some hostüe but unlawful action. So long as the poüce or
other authorities are able to maintain control, then (by definition) there is no riot.
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But sometimes, as occurred in Cicero and at Columbia, there is an extensive period
of „müling around," foüowed by a Single action (in the Cicero case, a teenager
throwing a rock at the apartment window, or in the Columbia case, a shout, some¬
thing like ,Let's take over Hamüton Hall'), and then in an instant, all are galvanized
into action.
From the perspective I have been developing today, what appears to be happen-
ing is this: authority remains vested in the police or other attendant authorities,
despite the fact that some other action, if successful, would be feit as highly satis-
factory by members of the müling crowd. During the period of müüng, an assess¬
ment is going on, of each by the others: What would he do if ...? and, What would
the authorities do if ...? Each recognizes that the consequences he can expect if he
takes an action which is not in comphance with authority depend wholly on
whether the large mass of others also withdraws control over their actions from
the authorities, divesting them for a time of theü authority. Finally, someone who
has less to lose than the others, estimating a sizeable following from that assessment,
takes an action. Immediately authority is withdrawn from the police or existing
authorities by crowd member, vested in the new leader, and the müüng period is
over.
How do such collectivities differ from those in which no mutual vesting of
authority has occurred? Some hint of this is given by a recent book by Irving Janis,
Victims of Groupthink (1972), in which he analyzes situations of this sort-where
each has given up a high degree of authority over his judgment to others in the
group. Janis shows that of course a consensus is achieved but the cases he analyzes
suggest that the consensus is less likely to be correct than the Situation in which
each retains authority over his own actions. If Janis's inferences are correct, they
are somewhat disconcerting, for they indicate the dangers of group processes in
which each member of the group vests in the group large amounts of authority
over his actions. But these illustrations constitute only a beginning. Once we have
the conception of each person in a group transferring some portion of authority to
the other group members, it becomes possible experimentally to fix the amounts of
authority that each transfers to the other, and to examine outcomes of experiments
under different structural conditions. And these empirical results also constitute a
challenge to the theory: Can the theory account for these results, and if so, how?
The example of persons in a collectivity placing themselves under the authority
of others can show another point as well. Such processes are ordinarily described,
not from the point of view of the person subjecting himself to the authority of
others, but from the opposite side, as „influence processes." A person's or a group's
influence may be said to spread widely. But there is something that a physical
scientist would regard as an aesthetic appeal that is missing here but exists if one
looks at matters as I have suggested. This is the fact that „influence" is not a con-
servative quantity, subject to laws of conservation, whüe control over action is
subject to conservation. That control is always a constant quantity, and differs only
in its distribution. It may remain in the hands of the original actor, or he may have
distributed it among others in any of a variety of ways. But as I indicated, this is
merely an aesthetic difference, untü it can be shown that the property of conserva¬
tion is valuable for the theory. So I introduce this point only as an aside.
I have pointed to a few problems and processes in the dynamics of authority
Systems. The last example, of the members of a group who distribute authority
over their actions to other group members, contains also problems in statics, because
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we are not only interested in what brings about such extensive vesting of authority
in others, but how such a system, once estabhshed, functions. It is to problems of
statics in authority Systems that I now turn.
Statics of Authority Systems
The kinds of problems in statics of authority Systems that come most quickly to
mind are those involving formal organizations, and especially ideal-typical bureauc¬
racy. What is it, for example, that makes petty officials in government Offices so
insensitive to clients' demands? The answer to this turns on a fundamental property
of a disjoint authority relation and a fundamental property of complex authority
Systems that I have aUuded to earüer: the fact, in a disjoint authority relation, that
the subordinate's interests are not satisfied through his actions that are düected by
a superordinate, but apart from them, and the fact that in a complex disjoint
authority system, the same is true of the lieutenant or agent. Thus in an ideal-typical
bureaucracy, there is the pecuhar spectacle (if we were not so inured to it) of a
whole structure of persons, at every level in the hierarchy, acting in the interests
of an actor other than themselves. It is this structural condition, this conflict of
interest between the interests of the superordinate under whose authority the sub¬
ordinate or üeutenant has contracted to act, and his own residual personal interests,
which have not vanished despite the fact that he has contracted to act in another's
interest, that creates most of the defects of functioning that are found in bureauc-
racies. It is responsible for petty officials' inattentiveness to clients' demands (for
however service-oriented the goal of the bureaucracy as an entity, the goal of its
petty officials is to draw a paycheck with minimum effort). It is responsible for
loafing on the job, featherbedding, developing norms to limit production, steahng
from a füm by employees, or appropriation of the firm's resources for personal
use, excessive attention to rules rather than goals (for the bureaucrat's Supervisors
find it much easier to punish disobedience of rules than to reward achievement of
goals). There are, of course, other sources of malfunctioning in bureaucracies and in
complex disjoint authority Systems generally, such as the Communications costs
that arise with size and structural complexity; but the class of problems I have
described is probably responsible for a larger fraction of the malfunctions that any
other. It is the cause of the extensive policing costs that arise in every large complex
Organization, and the cause of numerous modifications (of which more shortly)
that have been introduced into bureaucratic organizations.
This problem of whose interests are being pursued in a disjoint complex authority
system also helps answer the question of why workers in smaU füms work harder
than those in large firms, or why salaried persons in large automobile companies in
the United States (though not in large government agencies) work harder than blue
collar workers. In both these cases, some conjointness has been introduced: in the
first, by the smaU size of the firm, which leads each subordinate to see his interest
bound up with that of the superordinate; and in the auto firms, by a complex
system of bonuses dependent on theü unit's Performance, bonuses which are paid
to salaried workers but not to hourly workers.
Turning to a very different form of authority system, the commune, we can
describe it as a simple conjoint authority system, in which all have vested large
amounts of authority either in a Single charismatic leader (as is true in some com-
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munes, like that of Jonesvüle) or in the commune as a corporate actor. Why are
communes so unstable? Part of the answer lies in a special property of simple
authority Systems: the elements of the structure are not positions, as in a complex
authority structure. Rather, they are persons. Whüe a position as an abstract entity
is not subject to vagaries of sickness. temperament, or mental instabiüty, persons
are. Thus a simple authority structure under a charismatic leader is inherently
unstable. (A classic example is the case of the Jewish mystic of Smyrna in the 17th
Century, Sabbatai Zvi, who imagined himself the Messiah, and was widely beüeved
to be so. But at the height of his appeal, he confounded his followers by Converting
to Islam (Sholem, 1973).)
This, however, does not account for instabiüty of those communes in which
authority is vested in the coüectivity as a whole. First, we would expect them to be
more stable than the sort under the authority of a Single leader. Second, we see
empüically that in many such communes, the commune, as a corporate actor,
delegates much of its collected authority to an „agent," who is then in much the
same role as the charismatic leader. When the commune does not, however, and
governs itself through some kind of coUective instrument, there remains the fact
that the elements of the structure are persons rather than positions. If each has so
vested authority in the other commune members, we can expect extremes of psychic
instabiüty in the commune: coUective euphoria, coUective depression, the kind of
collective mental üistabüity ordinarily attributed to manic depressives.
But what about the other phenomenon in communes of the 1960's that I
mentioned earüer? Why was the principal problem of chüd-rearing one of inatten-
tion to children? The answer hes in a pecuhar characteristic of conjoint authority
Systems: All, leader and followers, share the same interest, and the work of each
contributes to the goals of all. As I indicated eariier, such a structure has one major
defect: what economists call the free rider problem. If all share the same interests,
and the efforts of each benefit all, then my own efforts contribute mostly to the
welfare of others, little to my own. Consequently, I may be better off as a free
rider, depending on the efforts of others. Unlike a disjoint authority system, the
conjoint system has no extrinsic benefits which may be made contingent on my
Performance. Thus unless the commune has devised some System of punishments
for non-performance, it is likely to be beset with a massive free rider problem. In
many of the communes of the 1960's, estabhshed with an anti-authoritarian ideology,
such punishments were not estabhshed, care of children was the responsibüity of all
and thus of no one. As a result, the chüdren were neglected.
Before turning to the question of why Hondas are of especially high quality,
there is one other example that I gave earher which exhibits a pervasive process in
the statics of authority Systems. Why do people vote (although, of course, not aU
do)? It would seem that those who do vote in an election, recognizing that those
who did not were no worse off than they, would not put forth the effort, smaU as
it is, in the next election. The same free rider problem exists here as in the case of
chüd rearing in the commune. But why does voting not suffer the neglect that
chüdren in the communes of the 60's suffered? One answer, of course, is that if it
took as much effort to vote as it does to raise chüdren, voting would very hkely
not be widespread-since the government under whose authority I wül find myself
is hardly dependent on how I cast my vote, or whether I cast it at all.
This answer, however, is not sufficient, for it does take some effort to vote, and
my vote has virtually no effect on the election outcome. There have been many
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atfempts by political scientists to account for what they caU „the paradox of
participation." But only one explanation seems at all satisfactory to me. This is that
we have all placed our voting actions under the authority of our fellow Citizens, ac-
cepting from them müd rebukes if we do not vote, and support if we do, and
offering the same to them if they vote or faü to do so. I find it uncomfortable, for
example, to admit to my fellow Citizens that I do not vote, no matter that I can
demonstrate to them that it is irrational to do so. This discomfort is the effect of
the müd rebukes that I experience from them. And why do we impose these sanc-
tions? Clearly as in the case of other norms: because it is in each of our interests for
others to be bound by this coUective authority, and we accede to being bound by it
as part of the task of insuring that others are bound by it. We would have very
specific predictions from this explanation: persons removed from theü social con-
text should be much less ükely to vote, for example.
Now, why are Hondas of high quality? The answer lies in one organizational
innovation that Honda has introduced. Inspection occurs at the beginning of each
unit of Operation, each sub-assembly, the final assembly, each painting Operation.
The receiving Operation exercises a „buy off," of its inputs from the departments
supplying its inputs, rejecting any item that does not meet quality specifications.
The compensation of the department performing the prior Operation thus depends
on the acceptance of its product by the subsequent Operation. This creates an
interest, in that department, in two thüigs: carefuUy inspecting the inputs it receives,
so that it is held responsible only for its own defects; and exercising care in its own
Operations. Thus acceptance-rejection buy-off at the end of the production process
reverberates back through the production Operations, giving each department a
strong interest in maintaining the quality, as weü as the quantity, of its Output. The
end result is an automobüe which, when measured by objective Standards against
others from traditionally-organized manufacturing departments, is of higher quahty.
I wül call this method of poücing the actions of subordinates in an authority
system „backward policing," beacuse it is poücing that begins at the end point of
the process and moves backward. It contrasts to the traditional „forward policing"
of complex organizations, which consists of supervision or monitoring by a super¬
ordinate (a foreman, a Supervisor, a „boss," a manager). The contrast is in two
respects: backward poücing is not policing by an actor in authority, but cuts across
the authority system; and backward policing is pohcing of the product, whüe
forward policing is poücing of actions. In forward poücing, the superordinate or his
agents exercise authority düectly, through the hierarchical structure of authority.
In backward poücing, authority is not exercised düectly. Rather, the authoritative
action consists of establishing or delegating the structure of rights that gives each
operating group the right to accept or reject the inputs to its Operations. But the
most fundamental change induced by backward policing is that it restructures the
subordinate's interest: his interest, which is satisfied by extrinsic payments in a
disjoint authority system, is düectly linked to the interest of the superordinate. For
the superordinate's interest is in the product of the Organization, and backward
policing makes this in the subordinate's and heutenant's interest as weü.
Backward policing is an example of one of two general classes of modifications
of complex disjoint authority Systems that have occurred in recent years.
Other examples within this class are bonus schemes for executives, incentive
payments for workers, and internal markets in corporations (an innovation intro¬
duced by another automobüe Company, General Motors, in the 1930's; the Honda
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buy-off at the assembly hne level carries the internal markets down to the intra-
departmental level). These modifications of complex disjoint authority Systems
have become increasingly widespread; they remain, however, less widely used in
government and other bureaucracies that do not have a marketed product. Another
more drastic modification of a complex disjoint authority system that faUs within
this same general class is franchising. The use of franchises in hoteis, fast food
restaurants, gasoline stations, ice cream parlors, real estate firms, and a number of
other geographicaUy dispersed retaü markets, has become widespread. When we ask
why the franchise, rather than its alternative, an extended authority system, with
each manager under the authority of the central executive, the answer is clear: This
Substitute for authority (since no authority is involved in the franchise relation)
again concerns the absence of necessity for policing. Franchise relations are wholly
self-policing, at the opposite extreme from the disjoint-complex relations they
replace.
A second general class of modifications of complex disjoint authority Systems is
that of introducing conjointness, inducing a düect interest on the part of the sub¬
ordinate in the success of the superordinate (which may be a corporate actor, such
as a Corporation). This is attempted in a variety of ways, which some of you wül
recognize from experience: Company songs (such as the IBM song, which continued
to be sung by some employees long after the Company was a bülion dollar Corpora¬
tion), Company social events, coUective or Joint activities of employees such as war
bond or blood donation drives, induced competition with an external competitor,
and other devices intended by the superordinate to make the Organization „like a
famüy." This has probably been done most successfuUy in Japanese corporations.
All these modifications are modifications in the düection of making the sub¬
ordinate's interest not merely contingent on, but identical to those of the superor-
dinate-that is, in the düection of moving a disjoint authority system toward one
that is conjoint. The aim is to bring about identification of the subordinate's
interests with those of the superordinate. Elsewhere I call such a subordinate an
„affine agent," in contrast to a „compensated agent," for at the extreme, the
affine agent requires no compensation-like the volunteer worker for a pohtical
candidate, whose sole compensation Ues in his candidate's winning. But that brings
us to more complex issues of authority Systems, for which there is not time here.
What I have attempted to do with the Honda example and the example of the
IBM Company song is to indicate how authority Systems may be modified to
ehminate or reduce some of the malfunctioning that exists in the statics of authori¬
ty Systems. Thus one can conceive of matters in this way: the statics of authority
Systems include processes that produce under certain conditions malfunctioning of
the authority system from the point of view of the superordinate. Cognizant of
these, he may use his authority to restructure the system, through a different
delegation of rights, or through attempting to induce conjointness. These actions
belong in the category of dynamics of authority Systems, for they are actions by
the superordinate that restructure the system. As they indicate, it is problems in the
statics of authority Systems that induce dynamic processes that change the system.
It is also the case that one may profitably explore authority Systems that consist of
amalgams of different types, for these amalgams have problems and processes uni-
que to them. For example, a nation-state can be regarded as a conjoint-disjoint
authority System: on the side of Citizen as subordinate vis-a-vis State as superordinate,
it is conjoint; on the side of government employee as subordinate, State as super-
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ordinate, it is disjoint. Trade unions and some voluntary associations have a
simüar
dual structure. These amalgams have unique problems of theü own, one of which
has been described by Robert Michels as the iron law of oligarchy. But all this gets
into a greater level of complexity than there is time for today. I must content
myself with having outlined the elements of a theory of authority Systems
and
having indicated some of the processes in the dynamics and the statics of authority
Systems. They have given some sense, I hope, of the nature of the theoretical enter-
prise, and perhaps, if I have been successful, a httle more insight into various
social
phenomena.
The challenge to „theories of authority" as developed by classical theorists is
just begun here. I use this forum to initiate the chaUenge, and will develop it further
in more comprehensive work.
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